PERCEPTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF NONACTUAL POSSIBILITIES

Margot Strohminger

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

It is widely assumed that sense perception cannot deliver knowledge of nonactual (metaphysical) possibilities. We are not supposed to be able to know that a proposition p is necessary or that p is possible (if p is false) by sense perception. This paper aims to establish that the role of sense perception is not so limited. It argues that we can know lots of modal facts by perception. While the most straightforward examples concern possibility and contingency, others concern necessity and impossibility. The possibility of a perceptual route to some modal knowledge is not as radical as it may at first sound. On the contrary, acknowledging it has benefits.

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References

1972Naming and Necessity 2000Knowledge and Its Limits 1986On the Plurality of Worlds 2002Knowledge and its Limits 2007The Philosophy of Philosophy 2017Perceiving, Acting and Knowing 1996The Conscious Mind 1994Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture

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2019Imagery and Possibility 2018Putting modal metaphysics first 2016Williamsonian modal epistemology, possibility-based 2018The epistemology of modality and the problem of modal epistemic friction

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