Comparative Corporate Governance

Abstract

The focus for legal academics’ interest in comparative corporate governance was once confined to side-by-side comparisons of the formal mechanisms of corporate governance, such as how boards were elected (who votes? when? what are the quorums?), what formulas defined the permissible dividend level, and what the proper business of the board might be, matters akin to the interest of a stamp-collector in classifying and mounting tiny items of limited general importance. Finance economists also limited their attention in comparative corporate governance, partly because the task of describing other systems was uninteresting and partly because high-powered event studies were hard to execute without good pricing data from a good stock market, which most other systems lacked.

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