Why Scientists Chase Big Problems: Individual Strategy and Social Optimality

Abstract

Scientists pursue collective knowledge, but they also seek personal recognition from their peers. When scientists decide whether or not to work on a big new problem, they weigh the potential rewards of a major discovery against the costs of setting aside other projects. These self-interested choices can potentially spread researchers across problems in an efficient manner, but efficiency is not guaranteed. We use simple economic models to understand such decisions and their collective consequences. Academic science differs from industrial R&D in that academics often share partial solutions to gain reputation. This convention of Open Science is thought to accelerate collective discovery, but we find that it need not do so. The ability to share partial results influences which scientists work on a particular problem; consequently, Open Science can slow down the solution of a problem if it deters entry by important actors.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 15 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.