Article2015

Promoting City Leaders: The Structure of Political Incentives in China

154 citations0/0 files storedThe China Quarterly

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China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance Local Government Finance and Decentralization Public Policy and Administration Research

Abstract

Abstract The shift in Beijing's priorities to more balanced and people-oriented development has led some localities to make more efforts in developing social policy areas. By investigating the personnel institution, a political incentive mechanism, this article aims to shed light on the structure of political incentives in China and why local political leaders improve public welfare in a non-democratic setting. A content analysis of 69 regulations that cover one-third of all municipal leaders shows that the formal evaluation rules for leaders in some localities have become more welfare-oriented to reflect Beijing's new focus on social policy areas. A statistical analysis further reveals that different political incentives operate for municipal Party leaders and mayors, and that political incentives to develop social policy vary across geographic regions. The statistical analysis exploits an original dataset I compiled from an online archive and statistical yearbooks, and contains biographic and career history data on municipal leaders between 2003 and 2010.

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References

2004Political turnover and economic performance: the incentive role of personnel control in China 2003State Capacity and Local Agent Control in China: CCP Cadre Management from a Township Perspective 2008Decentralized Authoritarianism in China 2012Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China 1999Selective Policy Implementation in Rural China 2001Power and wealth in rural China: the political economy of institutional change 2004Between Separate Stoves and a Single Menu: Fiscal Decentralization in China 1985The Cadre Management System, Post-Mao: The Appointment, Promotion, Transfer and Removal of Party and State Leaders

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