La négociation du temps de travail : l'emploi en jeu

Abstract

Persistent high unemployment has destabilized the labor relations system in France. Jobs have become an ever more important issue in negotiations about the time spent working. By combining legal and sociological analyses, it is shown that regulatory oversight has, since the 1980s, taken the place of a quite decentralized bargaining process that formed an exception to legal rules. Although jobs often stand at the top of the agenda in negotiations about work-time, it is less an actually targeted objective than a bargaining chip for working out agreements on other topics. The issue of jobs crops up in three types of situations. First of all, jobs may serve as a mere pretext for opening negotiations about the time spent working. Secondly, the jobs issue can also lead to solid commitments in exchange for measures allowing for more flexibility. Thirdly, it may be a formal objective for negotiators bargaining about work-time even though no party has any real interest in reaching such an objective. This diversity of cases and of forms of commitment raises question about the traditional principles of labor law.

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