Moral uncertainty and permissibility: Evaluating Option Sets

Christian Barry · Patrick Tomlin

32 citations0/0 files storedCanadian Journal of Philosophy

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

Abstract

Abstract In this essay, we explore an issue of moral uncertainty: what we are permitted to do when we are unsure about which moral principles are correct. We develop a novel approach to this issue that incorporates important insights from previous work on moral uncertainty, while avoiding some of the difficulties that beset existing alternative approaches. Our approach is based on evaluating and choosing between optionsetsrather than particular conductoptions.We show how our approach is particularly well-suited to address this issue of moral uncertainty with respect to agents that have credence in moral theories that are not fully consequentialist.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 32 citations exist upstream.

References

2011On What Matters 2000Moral Uncertainty and its Consequences 2007Don’t Know, Don’t Kill: Moral Ignorance, Culpability, and Caution 1992Non-consequentialism, the person as an end-in-itself, and the significance of status.2009What to Do When You Don’t Know What to Do 2009Oxford Studies in Metaethics 2006Rejecting Ethical Deflationism 2006Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.