Behavior as a Constituent of Conduct

Abstract

Psychologists have long argued over whether psychology is about behavior or about mental entities underlying behavior. This paper rejects both these views in favor of an alternative and more fruitful possibility that behavior is a constituent of the phenomena that count as psychological. To present this alternative, the paper begins by discussing the debate among psychologists about their subject matter. It then considers both the classification of conduct shared implicitly by members of the English-speaking community and the foundational status of this classification in psychology. Having done that, the paper turns to the connection between the ordinary classification of conduct implicit in English, on the one hand, and radical behaviorism, on the other. It later considers some ramifications of this connection. The discussion clarifies the subject matter prescribed for psychology by radical behaviorism and indicates the foundational status of op rant principles in a science of psychology.

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