Kantian Idealism Today

Abstract

Abstract Discusses in more detail the general features of many arguments in contemporary philosophy that are often understood as versions of Kantian idealism. Argues that they are in fact quite distinct from Kant’s own understanding of transcendental idealism because, unlike them, it depends essentially on the notion of our specific forms of intuition. Also attempts to mediate between non-ontological and ontological readings of Kant’s idealism presented in interpretations by Allison and Paul Guyer. Ends with a discussion of special difficulties that arise in Kant’s crucial arguments about space and time in the Antinomies, and it proposes that understanding transcendental realism as a specific way of absolutizing the forms of experience may offer the best strategy for making sense of the contradictions that Kant claims to find in dogmatic positions.

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