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Furner ! 3 that are red, wise, meaningful, etc. (i.e., that "have the property of " being red, wise, meaningful, etc.) are substances. Kinds and individualsSome metaphysicians describe a world comprised of kinds (a.k.a.categories, classes, sorts) and individuals.A thing X is a kind "iff there is something Y such that Y is an instance of X and Y is distinct from X"; while X is an individual "iff X is an instance of something Y (other than itself) and X itself has no instances (other than itself)" (Lowe, 1983, pp.50-51).For example, the mountain kind is instantiated by individual mountains, the artifact kind by individual artifacts, the kind kind by individual kinds, and so on.For any kind X-the mountain kind, the artifact kind, the kind kind, or any other kindwe may ask: What are the individually necessary and jointly sufficient identity conditions for instances of that kind?To put it this way is actually to conflate two separate questions: 31. What properties individuate (i.e., serve to distinguish) all instances of that kind from all instances of a different kind?For example: On what criteria are mountains to be distinguished from non-mountains?Among the properties that have been suggested as such criteria are high elevation, high relative relief, steep slope gradient, large land volume, small summit area, and short inter-valley distance. 42. What properties individuate any instance of that kind from any other instance of the same kind?For example: On what criteria is any one mountain to be distinguished from any other mountain (assuming we have already identified both as instantiations of the mountain kind)?Among the properties commonly suggested as such criteria are spatio-temporal coordinates (i.e., being located in a specific spatio-temporal position). Abstracta and concretaSome metaphysicians describe a world comprised of abstracta (a.k.a.abstract objects) and concreta (a.k.a.concrete objects).Treating concreta as a kind-i.e., the concretum kind-we may Some authors make a distinction between individuation conditions (addressed by the first question) and iden 3 tity conditions (addressed by the second question).See, e.g., Gerrard (1990, pp.3-5); for the limitations of this approach, however, see Smith and Mark 4 (2003).
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