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It is widely held that reasons, by their very nature, are the sort of thing it is wrong not to follow unless one has stronger justification to do otherwise. Dancy famously argues against this orthodoxy. This paper argues that he was correct. Some reasons are not in the wrong-making business: they are capable of rendering action intelligible without bringing any deontic vulnerability in their wake. The article first argues against a deontically reductive view of reasons. Even if all reasons impose deontic vulnerability, they cannot be reduced to such imposition, on pain of an overly thin view of agency; reasons also carry independent commendatory force. Having recovered the importance of commendatory force, the paper then argues that it can be instantiated without any accompanying peremptory force.
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