Professor Smart is not only a philosopher whose work has stimulated us and provoked controversy among us; he speaks to us as a representative of Australian philosophy – of a philosophy which has ties to both British and American philosophy, as well as a distinctive flavor of its own. He is a kind of philosophical Ambassador – and would that all Ambassadors were as well liked! On the present occasion he speaks to us not of his own philosophical work, unfortunately, but rather gives his impressions of the scene here. And, being a good philosophical diplomat, his impressions are friendly ones. But even giving friendly impressions of his host country can land an Ambassador in hot water. So it is not surprising, even if it is regrettable, that I, as a native of this particular philosophical jungle, should feel compelled to rebuff compliments so nicely turned, and should sadly retort that what he praises as the beauties of our philosophical landscape seem to me to be merely weeds. The views that Smart reports in extenso are the views of Paul Feyerabend. Smart also has a few words to say about some related views of Wilfrid Sellars. In my comment, I shall concentrate on Feyerabend's view, with which I am better acquainted than the papers by Sellars; and I shall rely not only on Smart's account of those views, but on the paper (Feyerabend, 1962) in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science to which Smart refers. Until otherwise indicated, all references to Feyerabend will be to this paper.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 38 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.