Are Mental Disorders Brain Diseases, and What Does This Mean? A Clinical-Neuropsychological Perspective

Abstract

Neuroscientific research has substantially increased our knowledge about mental disorders in recent years. Along with these benefits, radical postulates have been articulated according to which understanding and treatment of mental disorders should generally be based on biological terms, such as neurons/brain areas, transmitters, genes etc. Proponents of such a 'biological psychiatry' claim that mental disorders are analogous to neurological disorders and refer to neurology and neuropsychology to corroborate their claims. The present article argues that, from a clinical-neuropsychological perspective, 'biological psychiatry' is based on a mechanistic, 'cerebrocentric' framework of brain (dys-)function which has its roots in experimental neuroscience but runs up against narrow limits in clinical neurology and neuropsychology. In fact, understanding and treating neurological disorders generally demands a systems perspective including brain, organism and environment as intrinsically entangled. In this way, 'biological' characterizes a 'holistic', nonreductionist level of explanation, according to which the significance of particular mechanisms can only be estimated in the context of the organism (or person). This is evident in the common observation that local brain damage does not just lead to an isolated loss of function, but to multiple attempts of reorganization and readaptation; it initiates new developments. Furthermore, treating brain disorders necessarily includes aspects of individuality and subjectivity, a conclusion that contradicts the purely 'objectivist', third-person stance put forward by some proponents of biological psychiatry. In sum, understanding and treating brain damage sequelae in the clinical neurosciences demands a biopsychosocial perspective, for both conceptual and historical reasons. The same may hold for psychiatry when adopting a brain-based view on mental disorders. In such a perspective, biological psychiatry seems an interesting project but falls short of its original claims.

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