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Grasping the Third Realm
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Grasping the Third Realm (2015)Grasping the Third RealmMorality and Mathematics (2020)Morality and MathematicsEvolution and Moral Disagreement (2018)Evolution and Moral Disagreem…The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics (2017)The Generalized Integration C…The Intellectual Given (2015)The Intellectual GivenIntuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic (2015)Intuitions, Meaning, and Norm…Causal Impotence and Evolutionary Influence: Epistemological Challenges for Non-Naturalism (2015)Causal Impotence and Evolutio…The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1963)Justification and Explanation in Mathematics and Morality (2015)Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015)Evolution and Moral Realism (2016)An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (2017)Metaphysical and absolute possibility (2019)The Problems of Philosophy (1999)The Philosophy of Philosophy (2007)The meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)Naming and Necessity (1972)Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. (1979)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Experience and Evidence (2013)Ideal rationality and logical omniscience (2015)Acquaintance (2021)Word and Object (1960)Reason, Truth and History (1981)The descent of man, and selection in relation to sex (1871)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (2001)Language, Truth, and Logic. (1938)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)The Moral Problem (1994)
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  • 2015The Intellectual Given249 cited
  • 2020Morality and Mathematics147 cited
  • 2018Evolution and Moral Disagreement21 cited
  • 2017The Generalized Integration Challenge in Metaethics20 cited
  • 2015Causal Impotence and Evolutionary Influence: Epistemological Challenges for Non-Naturalism20 cited
  • 2015Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic17 cited

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