International financial regulatory cooperation

Abstract

This chapter evaluates the G20’s international financial regulatory architecture, with an eye to the volume’s core themes concerning experimentalist governance. It uses a comparison with the EU to explore the origins, character, and potential consequences of the G20 project. The chapter argues that a primary Euro-American goal behind the new international architecture is to prevent regulatory arbitrage; and that the EU’s uneven record suggests that experimentalist governance requires conditions beyond the few anticipated in experimentalist theory. The conditions identified in the EU are unlikely to be replicated at the international level. Deeper collaboration could rest instead on reciprocal capacities to limit foreign firm access to home markets. Yet there is little current evidence indicating that mutual fear of retaliation will serve as a penalty default, drawing the EU and the US into cooperation that approximates the ideals of experimentalist governance.

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