Rule‐Scepticism Restated

Abstract

The chapter is divided into two parts. The first one states the basic ideas of a sceptical theory of interpretation, whose main features are: (i) a number of distinctions among different kinds of interpretative practices; (ii) the distinction between two kinds of legal indeterminacy (indeterminacy of the legal system v. indeterminacy of any single rule); (iii) the identification of the main sources of indeterminacy (i.e., plurality of interpretive methods, juristic theories, sense of justice of interpreters). The second part is devoted to the criticism of the current non‐sceptical theories, viz. the ‘noble dream’, the ‘nightmare’, and the ‘vigil’ theories.

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