Singular Thought: In Defence of Acquaintance

Abstract

Abstract This chapter argues that singular thought about an object involves nondescriptive or de re ways of thinking of that object, that is, modes of presentation resting on contextual relations of ‘acquaintance’ to the object. Such modes of presentation are analysed as mental files in which the subject can store information gained through the acquaintance relations in question. The paper shows that the mental‐file approach provides an answer to the objection from ‘acquaintanceless de re thought’ (to the effect that tokening a singular thought does not require being actually acquainted with the object the thought is about), as well as a solution to a vexing problem regarding the communication of singular thoughts: if singular thoughts depend upon contextual relations to the objects of thought, how can they be communicated across contexts ? What makes communication possible when the speaker and the addressee do not stand in the same contextual relations to the objects the speaker's thought is about?

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