Which emotions are basic?

Abstract

This chapter proposes a way to reconcile traditional ‘cognitive’ theories of emotion, which assign a central role to beliefs or other cognitive states such as appraisals, with evolutionary accounts that emphasize the involvement of the body. The chapter's ‘embodied appraisal’ theory holds that emotions are simple perceptions of bodily changes (as William James argued), but also that the patterns of bodily response themselves can be culturally informed. Thus, emotions can be both embodied and socially constructed, so there is some truth in the views of both evolutionary psychologists and social constructionists. In arguing for this reconciliation, the chapter contests the claims put forward by some researchers, such as Paul Griffiths, that there are fundamentally different types of emotion.

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