Peirce's Semeiotic Model of the Mind

Abstract

INTRODUCTION In this chapter, I show how Peirce's model of mind is grounded in his semeiotic, or general doctrine of signs, a grounding made possible by the logical priority, in Peirce's thought, of the concept of sign over the concept of mind. I then compare this model of mind with some more recent doctrines and theories, and conclude with some comments on Peirce's relevance for cognitive science, including both artificial intelligence and human-computer interaction. PEIRCE’S DOCTRINE OF SIGNS Peirce’s doctrine of thought signs was first introduced in his justly famous 1868 articles in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy and later developed in greater detail from 1895 until Peirce’s death in 1914. In his 1868 papers Peirce specifically targeted Descartes and Cartesianism, and argued that we have no ability to think without signs. This argument presupposes a prior argument that all self-knowledge can be accounted for as inferences from external facts and that there is thus no reason to posit any power of introspection (CP 5.247–9). We need, therefore, to look to external facts for evidence of our own thoughts, and it is then a near-tautology to conclude that the only thoughts so evidenced are in the form of signs: “If we seek the light of external facts, the only cases of thought which we can find are of thought in signs” (CP 5.251).

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 46 citations exist upstream.