Functionalism and Logical Analysis

Abstract

The functionalist theory of mind is essentially a formal theory, drawing its plausibility largely from an appreciation of the logic and conception grammar of terms of psychological description. In this respect, the functionalist theory of mind exhibits significant methodological continuities with the phenomenological tradition. However, despite its successes, many philosophers believe that functionalism leaves out the central explanatory concept of phenomenology, that of immediate, subjective experience. This chapter analyzes the history of the development of functionalism, showing how it developed as a response to the problems of meaning and reference of psychological terms left open by earlier theories. This suggests new ways of viewing the sources of functionalism's continued problems with explaining consciousness.

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