Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision?

Abstract

Theories of rational decision normally distinguish basic and other preferences, using only the former for calculating the utility function of an agent. The idea behind the distinction is that, on the one hand, a theory of rational decision must allow criticism of at least a part of the agent's actual preferences; on the other hand, so as not to lose touch with the agent's real interests, it must rely on his factual preferences. Different decision theories have declared as basic various sets of preferences, thereby arriving at very different utility functions. Therefore, the question of which preferences shall be basic is of large practical importance. Nonetheless, it has rarely been discussed. This article criticizes some standard approaches, but mainly develops criteria for the selection of basic preferences. One of the principles for the selection of basic preferences, for example, is epistemological rationalization. From these principles, then, 12 conditions of adequacy for the selection of the preferential basis are derived, e. g. taking over only intrinsic preferences, and of these not the single preferences but their underlying criteria.

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