No open-access location is known for this record yet.
No open-access location is known for this record yet.
Abstract Moral particularism of the kind developed by Jonathan Dancy is treated as a topic in meta-ethics. Until it is applied to a suitable type of normative theory, criticisms which have assailed it are difficult to rebut. This chapter aims to apply Dancy's particularism to a type of virtue ethics, showing how many of these criticisms are off the mark. At the core of these criticisms is that of uncodifiability. Virtue ethics is held to be codifiable through the virtue rules which encode virtue-reasons for action, reasons which are argued to be particularist in Dancy's sense. That is, it is possible even for reasons expressed through the thick virtue concepts to switch valence. In the course of the argument, a virtue ethical view of right action (the target centered view) is developed.
Loading…
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.