Chapter2021

Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation

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Philosophical Ethics and Theory Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Free Will and Agency

Abstract

Abstract This paper (a forerunner of the author’s Practical Reality) considers in detail the distinction between the reasons we have to act in certain ways, often known as justifying reasons, and the reasons for which we act when the time comes, often known as motivating reasons. It argues that it must be possible for one and the same reason to play both roles. It warns accordingly against the popular version of that distinction which understands the reasons we have to act in certain ways with relevant features of the situation and reasons for which we act as certain psychological states of our own, combinations of beliefs and desires. Any such distinction makes it impossible to act for a good reason. The paper also offers some suggestions about what a better account of the distinction would look like.

Citations in this library

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References

1979What is Justified Belief?2008Internal and External Reasons 1995Making Sense of Humanity 1999Normative Requirements 2001Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge 1980Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge 2012Rethinking the GoodMoral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning 1998A Sensible Subjectivism?

Cited by

1998Mapping Moral Motivation 2002Practical Reality 2004Ethics and the a priori selected essays on moral psychology and meta-ethics 2009Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning 2009Rationality and Science 2009Procedural And Substantive Practical Rationality 2002Reconciling Realism with Humeanism

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