Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents: A Reply to Devitt

Abstract

Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk representations of standard linguistic entities (SLEs), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens these, things in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter as a result being stimulated by the wave forms we regularly produce when we execute our intentions to utter such tokens (a view I call Folieism). in his Ignorance Language, Michael Devitt objects to this view, arguing that, On Rey's view, communication seems to rest on miraculous guesses. I argue here that my view is not prey to his objections, and actually affords a scientifically more plausible view than his empiricist alternative. Specifically, I reply to his objections that my view couldn't explain the conventionality language and success communication (§2.1), that I am faced with intractable difficulties surrounding the identity intentional inexistents (§2.2), and that, contrary to my view, SLEs can be relationally defined (§2.3). Not only can Folieism survive Devitt's objections, but (§3) it also provides a more satisfactory account the role linguistic intuitions than the empirical account on which he insists.

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