On Knowing What We’re Doing Together

Abstract

An influential view argues that in order to act intentionally, the agent needs to know what he or she is doing. Such self-knowledge, it is claimed, is epistemically distinctive in that it is ‘groundless’—non-observational and non-inferential. This chapter investigates how this view relates to the theory of intentional joint action. Is our knowledge of what we are doing together with others—collectively, as a team or a group—of the same groundless kind? The chapter is divided in three sections. The first section unpacks the idea of groundless (individual) self-knowledge, as developed by G. E. M. Anscombe, and in more recent philosophical research. The second section plays the part of the individualist’s advocate. The third section argues against the individualist view, and defends (a moderate version of) groundless group self-knowledge. The knowledge in question is plural pre-reflective and non-thematic self-awareness of what it is the participants are doing together.

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