Problems at the Roots of Law

Abstract

Abstract This collection of essays is united by a common concern with basic questions pertaining to law and morality and the relation between the two. The first essay considers whether judges must appeal to natural law or natural justice when the law seems incomplete or indeterminate. In cases in which the law is immoral, natural law theorists and legal positivists align in their rejection of a moral obligation to obey the law. The second essay defends the view that moral rights exist independently of institutional structures. The complex issue of criminal entrapment is the focus of the third paper, and the position defended is that although an entrapped person sometimes may not be held criminally liable for the crime she voluntarily commits as a result of police enticement, in many cases we may make adverse moral judgments about her conduct. The view espoused in the fourth essay is that completed crimes and failed attempts should be treated in the same way when determining the appropriate punishment. The fifth essay offers various arguments to support the claim that funding of the arts through taxation is justified. Among other things, the arts offer intrinsic, though often benefitless, value to society, which is worthwhile to maintain and preserve. In the sixth paper, the discussion focuses on the notion of pure evil, or sheer wickedness, contrasting it with that of mental illness (or sick! sick! sickness) and identifying some places in which this distinction blurs. The final essay in this collection looks at how, since Plato's time, moral language and psychiatric language have fused ideas of immorality and mental illness.

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