Freedom of Movement and the Rights to Enter and Exit

Abstract

Abstract In earlier work, the author of this chapter has defended the asymmetric view on the rights to enter and exit countries. In particular, it was alleged that legitimate states are morally entitled to limit immigration with a great deal more discretion than they may employ to prohibit emigration. This general orientation has been challenged by two versions of a more symmetric approach to the twin rights to enter and exit. This chapter starts by critically examining the view that states may not restrict immigration in the manner that it is alleged, and then it goes on to address the argument that states may permissibly limit emigration much more than one might initially suspect.

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