Symbolic protest and calculated silence

Abstract

The reasons for protesting a serious injustice are usually not hard to find. One wants to put an end to the wrongdoing, to prevent its recurrence, or at least touch some consciences in a way that may prove beneficial in other contexts. But sometimes there seems to be no reasonable hope of achieving these ends. The perpetrators of injustice will not be moved, protest may be inconvenient or risky to oneself, and its long-range effects on others may be minimal or may include as much harm as help. To protest in these circumstances seems at best a symbolic gesture. But is it a gesture worth making? Attitudes about this diverge sharply. Some say that, despite the consequences, protest is called for: “One cannot stand silently by.” To denounce injustice at a risk to oneself is morally admirable, they say, whether or not it produces a positive net utility. Others see symbolic protest as pointless and at times reprehensible. If the overall effects for others are not better and it entails harm or risk to oneself, is it not foolish? And isn't the motive simply a self-righteous desire to be, or appear, morally “pure”? These conflicting attitudes pose a problem of understanding for moral philosophy. The point of view behind the second attitude is clear enough: acts, including speech acts, are to be evaluated by their probable consequences; no one is morally required to take risks unless the probable consequences are beneficial; what is commendable is regard for the best results, not futile gestures.

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