Reflective Judgment and the Application of Logic to Nature: Kant's Deduction of the Principle of Purposiveness as an Answer to Hume

Abstract

Abstract This essay examines Kant's account of the purposiveness of nature as a transcendental principle of the power of judgment in its reflective capacity in the two versions of the Introduction to the third Critique. It argues that, in virtue of its role in the formation of empirical concepts and laws, this principle lies at the center rather than the periphery of Kant's epistemology. It further argues that the transcendental deduction that Kant provides for it in the published version of the Introduction constitutes his definitive answer to Hume regarding the rational grounding of induction. And, finally, it argues that what differentiates the principle of purposiveness from the transcendental principles of the first Critique is its purely subjective nature. Whereas the latter involve the understanding legislating to nature, purposiveness involves the power of judgment legislating to itself regarding how it must investigate nature.

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