The Phenomenal and the Representational

Abstract

Abstract This book is about two kinds of properties of perceiving subjects: their phenomenal properties, and their representational properties. It focuses on three questions: What are phenomenal properties? What are representational properties? What is the relationship between phenomenal and representational properties? The book's answers to these questions are guided by two ideas, which have both been around for a long time. The first is that experience is transparent, in the sense that attention to one's perceptual experiences is intimately involved with attention to the objects and properties those experiences present as in one's environment. The second is that one of the roles of perceptual experience is to make objects and properties available to the perceiver for thought. It argues that, suitably formulated, these two ideas can go quite a long way in revealing the nature of the contents of experience, and the way in which those contents are related to phenomenal properties.

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