Coping with Complexity: Internal Audit and Complex Governance

Abstract

Complexity, a key issue in accountability research, is almost coterminous with modern governance. Increased complexity is a key external contingency driving analyses of public administration. Scholars often conclude that “traditional” forms of centralized accountability and control are no longer feasible in the face of complexity, but at the same time, internal audit in government, as a form of centralized accountability and control, is expanding its scope. This apparent paradox is addressed by means of mixed research methods focusing on how internal auditors in government understand and cope with complexity. The article demonstrates that auditors do so by hybridizing values and through professional and relational anchoring of practices. The results suggest that public administration scholars should not write off centralized control in complex systems of governance. The article also suggests that new accountability issues arise, relating to professional autonomy and influence inside government.

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