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The Thomist 71 (2007): 39-64 PERFECT AND IMPERFECT VIRTUES IN AQUINAS THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR. University ofSt. Thomas Houston, Texas RECENT YEARS have seen much criticism of the traditional Thomistic position that the acquired moral virtues are connected through prudence and that neither they nor acquired prudence can exist perfectly in someone who has not been assisted by grace. This criticism is in large part based on an oversimplification of Thomas's understanding of the different grades or states of virtue.1 One kind of criticism is directed against Thomas's theory that the virtues are connected. Peter Geach, for instance, chides Thomas for holding that "all the virtues stand and fall together."2 He seems unaware of the Thomistic distinction between imperfect and perfect acquired virtue and how it is related to arguments for the connection of the moral virtues. Another kind of criticism questions whether the traditional interpretation of Thomas's position on acquired moral virtue adequately represents his position. For example, Bonnie Kent has attacked Alasdair Maclntyre's version of the standard Thomistic view in part by repeating the well-known facts that Thomas holds that non-Christians can perform good acts and that the acquired 1 I am here relatively loosely using the words "grade," "state," and "level." As I will show below, some of the distinctions are between kinds of virrues (e.g., between acquired and infused virrue), and one may be within the same kind of virtue (i.e., between imperfect and perfect acquired virrue). Thomas does not use a consistent terminology to describe these distinctions. 2 Peter Geach, The Virtues, The Stanton Lectures 1973-74 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 164. 39 40 THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR. virtues are not infused directly by God.3 She confuses the traditional thesis that even acquired virtue depends on grace for its full development with the view that there is no natural acquired virtue without grace. Her failure to make fine-grained distinctions leads to a misreading of Maclntyre's interpretation of Thomas's position.4 Brian Shanley has similarly criticized Jacques Maritain and John of St. Thomas, who both presented the traditional argument that rectitude towards the natural and supernatural last end is necessary for the possession of that perfect acquired prudence which connects the acquired virtues.5 Although she does not defend Shanley's understanding of pagan virtue, Angela McKay has recently criticized aspects of my argument against Shanley and Kent by misreading my position as one that denies that there can be any acquired prudence without grace.6 This misrepresentation follows the familiar pattern in that it does not admit the distinctions between perfect and imperfect acquired virtue which are necessary for the traditional argument. McKay's misrepresentation of my view is significant in that it mischaracterizes the traditional view on the indirect dependence of perfect acquired virtue on grace as the view that there is no acquired virtue without grace. This misinterpretation is common to Shanley, Kent, and Geach. Since it is both widespread and touches on issues that are central to Thomas's moral thought, I shall present a brief defense of the traditional view, including a description of the way in which the virtues are traditionally distinguished. I shall first look at the relevant texts and then 3 Bonnie Kent, "Moral Provincialism," Religious Studies 30 (1994): 269-85; Virtues ofthe Will: The Transformation ofEthics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 27-33. 4 "Maclntyre's answer is clear: I must dismiss all your virtues as merely apparent. Because true moral virtues must be directed to the ultimate end for human beings-the perfect happiness of the afterlife-no one lacking the necessary direction can have any virtues at all" (Kent, "Moral Provincialism," 269). 5 Brian J. Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," The Thomist 63 (1999): 553-77. 6 Angela McKay, "PrudenceandAcquiredMoralVirtue,"TheThomist69 (2005): 535-55. She criticizes my article, "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory," The Thomist 67 (2003): 279-305. PERFECT AND IMPERFECT VIRTUES 41 discuss five states of virtue that are relevant to the contemporary debates. Then I shall show how the distinction between perfect and...
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