Kant’s deductions of morality and freedom

Abstract

Abstract It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom inGroundworkIII. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the secondCritique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument inGroundworkIII rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the secondCritique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works.

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