Gays, Cross-Dressers, and Emos

Abstract

Much has been written about gender-based violence against Iraqi women under the thirty-five-year dictatorship of Saddam Hussein and since the fall of the regime in 2003 (Brown and Romano 2006, 56, 60–62; Al-Jawaheri 2008, 108–17; al-Ali 2005, 742–43, 754–55; 2007, 198, 207, 226–29; 2008, 413–16; Smiles 2008, 272–76; al-Ali and Pratt 2009, 78, 80, 157–61; Campbell and Kelly 2009, 24–25; Fischer-Tahir 2010, 1391–92; Ranharter and Stansfield 2015). Although the mass recruitment of men as soldiers and fighters often temporarily expanded spaces for women’s participation in the Iraqi public sphere (Efrati 1999, 28, 30–32; Rohde 2010, 86–91), militarism and militarist discourse before and since 2003 have reinforced gender polarity and heroic forms of masculinity, marginalizing and degrading the noncombat social positionalities of the majority of men and women (Rohde 2010, 124–43; 2011, 100, 104, 109–10; Fischer-Tahir 2012, 93–94; Abdulameer 2014). Nevertheless, organized violence against queer positionalities, or men perceived to violate sexual and gender norms, occurred only after 2003. This essay explores ruptures and continuities in organized violence against sex or gender nonconformity in recent Iraqi history.For the late Baʿthist period in Iraq, I analyze scholarly and journalistic sources, including items published in Iraqi newspapers and transcripts of a conversation between Saddam Hussein and tribal leaders in 1991 or 1992. For the years after 2003, I systematically analyzed four Iraqi (Arabic) daily newspapers (Al-Zaman, Al-Sabah, Al-Mada, and Al-Manara) and a weekly journal (Al-Esbuʿiyya) from late 2008, 2009, and spring 2012. I draw on other sources as well, including news videos, human rights reports, academic work, and other journalistic sources. Given the dangers and restrictions of research in Iraq, the available sources allow some preliminary analysis that can inform future systematic studies on gender and sexual diversity in Iraqi society.There is little research about the Iraqi Baʿthist regime’s handling of nonnormative sexualities and masculinities. Regime propaganda during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–88) propagated a crude heroic and heterosexual military masculinity (Saghieh 2006, 242; Rohde 2010, 124–43). Previously classified sources from the innermost circle of the Hussein regime became accessible after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, which US military personnel captured and transferred to the National Defense University in Washington, DC (Woods, Palkki, and Scott 2011). Among the sources was a recorded conversation dated from 1991 or 1992 between Hussein and tribal elders from what was then called Saddam City (Sadr City today), a notoriously rebellious Baghdadi slum inhabited by some 2.5 million impoverished Shiʿi Iraqis, most of whom had migrated from rural areas in southern Iraq over the previous decades. Saddam City had been the scene of insurgent activities and demonstrations during the 1991 popular uprising. Many soldiers who had deserted the Iraqi army after being crushed by Western firepower in early 1991 reportedly blended into this densely populated area in various forms of dress and survived as burglars and beggars.In a bid to reassert control, Hussein approached local tribal leaders in Saddam City to enlist them to police the neighborhood since state and party institutions had proven unsuccessful in this respect. During the conversation, Hussein called opponents of his regime “rabble-rousers” (ghughaʾiyyin), a term that started to appear in 1991 in the Baʿth Party’s internal records to refer to insurgents. Aaron M. Faust (2015, 133, 242n64) contends that this sign operates as a “euphemism for Shiʿites” because the majority of insurgents came from predominantly Shiʿi provinces. No sectarian connotation is apparent in this account. Rather, Hussein decries nonnormative masculinities as against Islam and the Iraqi nation:The rabble-rousers do not know these notions [of tribal loyalty to the dictator]. Those who dye their hair in green and red do not know these meanings, and it is a shame for you to let them live. You should slaughter them with your own hands. Those people who dye their hair and wear red lipstick like women, I say you must slaughter them and hold me responsible for it. . . . Whoever dyes his hair and wears makeup like women is effeminate. In my knowledge, the first fatwa of our master Ali [Ibn Abi Talib, the prophet’s nephew and son-in-law, and the founder of Shiʿi Islam] was related to one case that happened to Muslims the first time someone deviated. When . . . they asked [Ali] about the solution, “What should we do with this man?” he replied, “We should climb to the highest point, throw him upside down and let him fall down head first.” This was a big fatwa. . . . I am seeking your help with the issue of those who dye their hair and wear women’s clothes. This is shameful for Iraqis and against Islam. If a Syrian, Egyptian or Moroccan saw those people, he would laugh and say “What is that? Is that a man or a woman?” Iraqis are not like that, Iraqis are real men. (quoted in Woods, Palkki, and Scott 2011, 207–10)The former dictator refers to men and boys who engage in nonnormative bodily practices such as dying their hair and wearing makeup, and the fatwa he refers to explicitly addresses homosexual acts. The commonly used term for effeminate men (mukhanathiyyin) is a synonym for male homosexuals in Iraq (Luongo 2010, 105). Although I cannot verify whether the antiregime activities that triggered this conversation included significant numbers of cross-dressing boys and men, Hussein’s emphasis on this issue suggests that he thought so; moreover, the fatwa he refers to is often cited by Islamist ideologues in order to legitimate violence against gays (Zollner 2010). While it may seem odd for a secular dictator to quote this fatwa, it was likely an opportunistic appeal to mobilize a Shiʿi audience Hussein understood to be Islamist and conservative. The rebuff from one of the tribal elders to Hussein’s appeal, which Hussein repeated three times, is equally remarkable: “Master, there is a more important issue than that, it is hurting citizens’ feelings” (Woods, Palkki, and Scott 2011, 210). The sheikhs apparently refused to engage Hussein on his homophobic terms, indicating that cross-dressers were not scandalous to them. Further, they were courageous enough to point out that they understood the cause of social unrest in the neighborhood to be the rising crime rate attributed to deserters from the Iraqi army.Homosexuals and male-to-female transgender persons were visible and widely known to be part of Baghdad society at the time. Ali al-Hilli, an activist in the organization Iraqi LGBT, who left Iraq in 2000, remembers that the regime “allowed a measure of liberation” between the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. There was increased visibility of male homosexual scenes in more affluent parts of Baghdad: “There were so many guys, from Kuwait, from Saudi Arabia, guys in the streets with makeup” (Buckley 2007). The conversation between Hussein and the tribal leaders indicates that such communities also existed in poor neighborhoods. Dhia al-Saray (2009) mentions that in the late Baʿthist period, female hormones were freely available in Iraqi pharmacies. In a 2007 interview, al-Hilli mentions an old friend named Haidar “Dina” Fayek who was murdered shortly before the interview. Haidar/Dina “worked in the prostitution industry as a transsexual madam, was a fixture in Baghdadi gay circles, [and was] always loud and fun and quick with a laugh. She never hid her orientation and indeed lived openly as a woman” (France 2007; see also Ireland 2006). But as al-Hilli’s account of his own experience demonstrates, the regime’s intelligence services exploited the vulnerability of gay men in Iraqi society by attempting to blackmail them into becoming spies, particularly if they were in contact with foreigners (France 2007). Nevertheless, the situation was not desperate in the 1990s for most men with nonnormative gender and sexual embodiments and identities or for those who engaged in same-sex relations.In 1994, a few years after the conversation between Hussein and tribal leaders in Saddam City, the daily newspaper Babil, owned by Hussein’s eldest son ʿUday, ran an article on the “scandal” of an ensemble of “Egyptian” mukhanathiyyin (male-to-female transvestites) performing in a Baghdad restaurant. Numerous published photos depicted the performers in drag. According to the published account, which included the restaurant’s name and address, “Babil’s secret camera managed to collect these gleanings of a roaming band of Egyptian queers [al-nafar al-dal min al-mukhanathiyyin al-misriyyin] who can be seen in these pictures like morally corrupt women. . . . Is this tolerable in the country of struggle and brave people?” (Babil, January 13, 1994; my translation). This article was published when the regime was clamping down on Baghdadi nightlife. Saddam Hussein had banned the public sale of alcohol and ordered all nightclubs closed as part of an Islamization campaign, the National Faith Campaign (Bengio 1998, 176–91; Rohde 2013, 714–17). These efforts were widely understood as symbolic gestures aimed at appeasing religious forces and suppressing conspicuous consumption, given the severe UN sanctions; at the time most Iraqis could hardly afford to buy food. As a result, such performances were no longer publicized (fig. 1).Despite Saddam Hussein’s declared aversion, the regime did not conduct organized assaults on gay men, and queer life continued. An Iraqi gay man (“Kemal”) described in an account by Afdhere Jama (2008, 49–53) reports moving from his native Najaf to Baghdad in the 1990s, where he eventually lived in a romantic relationship with a wealthy older man in the upscale Mansour district. Both participated openly in social life in the permissive enclaves of well-to-do Baghdadis. Later in the 1990s, after they had split up, Kemal worked for international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and charities and lived “a good, stable life” in the Zaytouna neighborhood. Of this period, he says: “It was work, have fun, and [I] lived my life without any stress. I met various guys as lovers and although none of them worked out, I was still happy with my life” (Jama 2008, 52). Of course, Kemal’s account does not reflect the experiences of most Iraqis, who suffered greatly under UN sanctions, and it might be inflected by a degree of nostalgia, given the deterioration that occurred after 2003. Still, by all available accounts, popular nightclubs known to be frequented by gays remained in 1990s Baghdad, including in upscale hotels, “gay cafés and cruising points on Abu Nuwas Street . . ., among other gathering spots” (Luongo 2010, 99–100; see also Buckley 2007).Although there was relative openness to male nonnormative gender and sexual practices, by 2000 there was a full-fledged campaign against women deemed prostitutes by Saddam’s Fedaʾiyyin, a paramilitary group founded in 1994 and run by Hussein’s son ʿUday. This militia formed part of what is called the “shadow state” in late Baʿthist Iraq since it existed outside the Ministry of the Interior and reported directly to ʿUday Hussein (Sassoon 2012, In a of human rights from Iraqi in and and then of women who were in by the According to their these often women who may have been prostitutes who most often have been or are in some of to the for party and personnel often the like for the of with those who shame The and were to the and were in of their for to after an of the of women in the of this campaign widely fall between and of the of women is to the of The of women’s with a discourse of and shame is by ʿUday Hussein’s in this campaign against women and Pratt 2009, This violence occurred outside state The Iraqi of that prostitution should be with a to and a The does not same-sex activities between in public or by men, which them for a to be a In the of by a man to be The that prostitution into a crime was on after the end of the campaign against women homosexual practices, the without to the of it did not homosexual as was often In 2003, the and all to Iraqi after were declared and by who was to Iraq by and the during the Iraq This the the Iraqi and all to the of The to the was not declared after forces in the that and queer communities and are of and human and are the of that as in the of a rising of in of According to available of or known gay and transgender boys and men started as early as in the violence of the US in Iraq, and militia of these in international in and on from Baghdad and these reports attributed the to the which part of the of Iraq fatwa in on Ali the of men in of The fatwa was from the as a of by to reports Buckley 2007; 2008, the violence in daily life to a in including gay in Baghdad, and other and part of the in and the of the formed in by as of 2009, In 2009, these men, who were from the Baghdad neighborhood that was a of the 1991 against Hussein’s on a campaign that and men and boys as homosexuals The of this was on a of that in the late 1990s under the of the of According to a in 2009, Shiʿi in Baghdad a of services to against The that in a the previous the that the should be from such like and the among he reportedly is from and and a by to in Iraq, the their experiences of violence and and being at police 2012, for the contends that the state cannot that is to Iraqi and that gay people should local There is only of of or women as part of this The of available may reflect the of Western and of on or the of or women in Iraqi society 2009, see also and Islamist campaign against Iraqi boys and men as gay was by the and Iraqi When by Iraqi sources, the was and all explicitly the An article by (2009) published in the daily newspaper what he called the of to Western and against their on Iraqi society as a also 2010, in a published on the campaign, are homosexuals or as these are being called who from the These are that and them. The police are because there is in the of the Iraqi that this According to reports in international the police indeed a to these organized and at participated in the of gays and of men and boys as gay also occurred in and on a more and were attributed to Shiʿi and US invasion and the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime the of nonnormative sexual and in The more of the in Iraq after 2003 gay Baghdad and outside of and gay like or known to a local audience (Luongo 2010, In the and that the sex became a of for men and which the visibility of homosexual practices and the of Islamist (Jama 2008, 52). There was a of women and sex after 2003, particularly prostitution of in Iraq 2010, The and of men has been understood as an of and US forces in Iraq, including in the Abu this 2005, 2006, 2007, There is not that with gay or invasion and have the and experiences of in Iraqi in early 2012, a of against and who were as was used to a of was reported in Baghdad and southern Iraqi The were attributed to the and of the The to between under to were male see also and were of being and The in the US scene and refers to has a and or According to the or as it the and of more or recent became popular in various in the and 2013, According to first started to appear in Iraq in most of them are between and the majority are male and one the of that Western also the Iraqi from Najaf described by of her of US her to the and with In 2012, this was in upscale particularly in and There was a of in some Iraqi in as these of men are more courageous and one more of them in the militia are with other and that them some to dress as they to the relative in the Iraqi the of homosexual men in 2009, the spring violence against triggered a among and were of the campaign and for on the sources of The was to be a against social and the situation in Iraq after years of article the of with the of in state had by men and their to one account in the weekly are being The article that under the former regime social nonconformity had not been as it also the of social on the of in female as is as that being is about and and is not a sign of that are “a for Iraqi and and for a to with and a in order to such Nevertheless, he that the and situation in Iraq under the former regime and the US is responsible for the of Iraqi that violence is the to with the and on state to to the of as to Iraqi their to the by and that is an to out of the of The of an in that is a by to the of life in The the of as and a on the of a at a suggests that most thought they were and saw the as a to the violence and of life in Iraq violence against the of to the of the former regime and on to and to to people, and to them for between those for whom being is a and those who are homosexuals or sex social who that in case cause no to the as the for the of Western in Iraq such as his is against the which he for to and for them. also as a cause for the of sectarian who against According to the of is by religious and to in society as a of published in the daily by an explicitly about in Iraqi According to this being is about and is a for people to to with in their The that it is to between male and female because of their the between and in contends that are the real who should be approached and into a with the to the violence of 2009, Iraqi the of and to against the Shiʿi including and Ali the and called for the in the of the The of the human rights of the Iraqi called for efforts to against the of still that violence is no Although they the these also that should have no in Iraqi is to whether the these out of or to human rights and is also that the public of the their the of the Iraqi discourse was more In August the Ministry of a that to the of which it called in our The Ministry of a in that would be from that had to be from their from the Ministry of the which the called for the of 13, 2012, the a on that had been on the of or and that they have to them as as because the of this have to in and are a the was to issue a about and attempting to as for and religious from any conduct against people on a dress or the the Ministry of the Interior a campaign to the of by out police to that and in neighborhood. there that the of Iraqi society and people, whom they of Western practices and The social nonconformity in these and the of police in that a significant degree of between parts of the Iraqi and the most of the and sexual practices and identities are in Iraq and other parts of the and with to same-sex and gender and sexual nonconformity Saddam Hussein’s homophobic there is no of organized violence against gays or cross-dressers by the Baʿthist or before 2003. of violence against gender and sexual in Iraq the and are part of on Iraqi gender and sexual diversity is often for in have such in Iraq and as of a struggle between and an that to human with with the of visible 2006, 2010). This is and has been and against nonnormative gender and sexual and identities has been attributed to the of the Iraqi state and the of violence after of and and 2008, and 2009, of that the male as the is (Rohde 2010, 124–43; 2011, 109–10; 2013, Abdulameer 2014). This of masculinity and Iraqis who do not The and by Iraqis since 2003 have increased organized gender and sexual violence and of that is that sectarian have in and other over militia forces that outside state of these are widely understood to be with Shiʿi in the and some are with the Although these are not to the their are by state who to the and often issue or police are often in violence against gender and sexual the 2013, In their for control, they against social and in the of gender and The organized in Iraq are of the of women deemed prostitutes in 2000, when Saddam Hussein’s son ʿUday the campaign and the the by a that sex a and after 2003, the and sexual practices were understood to and to Iraqi society and

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