NON-HUMEAN BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS

Abstract

Behavior analysis exemplifies a highly peculiar type of explanation in which behavior is said to arise from past interactions with environment rather than from internal mental states. Radical behaviorism has been advanced as a philosophy of science that could legitimate this explanatory specificity of behavior analysis. As described by its proponents, radical behaviorism is a philosophy of science that stresses prediction and contol, that takes empirical regularities to be building blocks of behavior science, and that proceeds without hypothesizing unobservable states of affairs. In this article I argue firstly that it is a mistake to ground behaviorism (of any kind) in a philosophy of science, secondly that philosophy of science known as radical behaviorism is deficient, and thirdly that one can reject this philosophy and make use of a particular type of hypothetical constructs without ceasing to be radical or behavioristic. The philosophy of science I propose as an alternative to Skinnerian inductivism embraces causation as a metaphysical primitive and redirects behavior analysis toward study of invisible relations of influence between environment and behavior. Behaviorism, in any of its incarnations, has often been seen by supporters and critics alike as application of a philosophy of science to problems of psychology. Most of Watson's (1913) manifesto, for example, can be read in this light. When Watson criticizes introspective method for irreproducibility of its results (p. 163) or its empirical sterility (p. 176), he is bringing forward considerations that fit in general domain of philosophy of science. These considerations are topic-neutral in sense that they could apply to any scientific field other than psychology. Admittedly, not all of Watson's criticisms or claims are of this type. When he writes that the behaviorist, in his efforts to get a unitary scheme of animal response, recognizes no dividing line between man and brute (p. 158), he is not pondering a general issue of philosophy of science but making a specific proposal about role of evolution in behavior. Nevertheless, most of Watson's arguments for his behaviorism are of philosophy-of-science type. It is similarly possible to justify explanatory practices of behavior analysis in terms of a philosophy of science. A difficulty in carrying this program out is that

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