Financing Strategies for a Capital-Constrained Supplier under Yield Uncertainty

Abstract

We consider a supply chain consisting of a supplier and a distributor, in which the supplier has a capital constraint and faces productivity yield uncertainty. To solve the capital constraint problem, we propose an advance payment with risk compensation (APRC) mechanism, under which the distributor finances the supplier with an advance payment, and the supplier provides a price discount to compensate the distributor for the supplier's bankruptcy risk. The optimal solutions are derived under the APRC mechanism and the results indicate that under the APRC, the whole supply chain performs as well as if there is no capital constraint, in terms of profits and optimal strategies. Therefore, the APRC is an efficient solution for the supplier's capital constraint issue. In addition, when the deficit is big, the APRC provides an alternative financing arrangement and it can bring higher profits for both parties. Another very interesting finding is that, when the capital deficit is small, the supplier can do better with the bank loan financing, despite that a higher interest rate needs to be paid in this case.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 17 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.