Philosophy and Philosophical Method

Abstract

This chapter discusses the main features of Ludwig Wittgenstein's conception of philosophy, both early and late. It also assesses these features for their merits, partly with a view to current debates. The chapter addresses that his radical position is more than a whimsical manifestation of an anti-scientific ideology: it is supported by arguments deriving from astute observations about the peculiar character of philosophical problems on the one hand, and logico-semantic ideas on the other. It also describes three tensions in Wittgenstein's account of conceptual elucidation: treating it as a kind of (psycho-) therapy or propaganda for a particular point of view vs. regarding it as a type of dialectic argument; insisting on it having a purely critical purpose in dissolving philosophical puzzles vs. allowing for a more positive project of conceptual self-understanding; and rejecting systematic theories vs. envisaging systematic surveys of our conceptual scheme.

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