Abstract Recently, several theorists have proposed that we can perceive a range of high‐level features , including natural kind features (e.g., being a lemur ), artifactual features (e.g., being a mandolin ), and the emotional features of others (e.g., being surprised ). I clarify the claim that we perceive high‐level features and suggest one overlooked reason this claim matters: it would dramatically expand the range of actions perception‐based theories of action might explain. I then describe the influential phenomenal contrast method of arguing for high‐level perception and discuss some of the objections that have been raised against this strategy. Finally, I describe two emerging defenses of high‐level perception, one of which appeals to a certain class of perceptual deficits and one of which appeals to adaptation effects. I sketch a challenge for the latter approach.
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 81 citations exist upstream.
Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.