A Case for Preserving Regulatory Distinctions

Abstract

The structure of the monetary, banking, and financial institutions of the United States is currently a topic of unusual excitement and controversy. Divers reforms have been proposed, some in legislative form. No consensus has been reached, and at present there appears to be a political stalemate. Meanwhile, the structure is changing in a piecemeal and anarchic fashion, as a result of technological and institutional innovations, private initiatives, accidental quirks of an-cient laws, administrative and judicial decisions, and actions by various states. As recent events attest again, Congress cannot agree on basic solutions and tries halfheartedly to arrest the disorderly drift. Two sets of issues are before the Congress, the Executive, the. courts, and the country. One concerns the range of activities per-mitted to various types of financial and nonfinancial enterprises and their affiliates or subsidiaries. Should banks and other depositories, or their holding companies, be allowed to engage in various businesses

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