John Dewey's Radical Logic: The Function of the Qualitative in Thinking

Abstract

In his later works, John Dewey questioned some of the traditional assumptions \nabout the nature and function of the qualitative in inquiry. Dewey foresaw what \nrecent scientific accounts of human thinking are confirming: it is more complex, \nless linear, more emotional, affective, bodily-based, non-reflective, non-linguistic, \nnon-conscious than philosophers have assumed. Commentators on Dewey have \nemphasized how inquiry is social, instrumental, and experimental, but for the most \npart have neglected the qualitative dimension of inquiry. The first section of this \nessay outlines the different forms that the neglect of the qualitative has taken in \nDewey scholarship. The second addresses what Dewey means by the qualitative. The \nthird presents nine specific functions the qualitative has on thinking (inquiry). The \nessay concludes in the fourth section with some implications of the view presented \non the normative dimension of Dewey’s philosophy, and suggests which promising \nfuture inquiries remain open regarding the function of the qualitative in inquiry.

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