The political economy of non‐tariff measures

Abstract

Abstract This paper examines the extent to which non‐tariff measures (NTMs) are set for protectionist purposes. Our main focus is on developing countries. Overall results show that NTMs reflect protectionist forces, in particular for those that have been subject to trade concerns at the World Trade Organization (WTO). For the other measures, there is no evidence that protectionism is the driving force behind their adoption, suggesting that their determinants may be associated with legitimate goals such as consumer health and safety. Furthermore, transnational lobbying, defined as the participation of national business groups at the Ministerial Conferences—the highest authority of the WTO—is positively associated with the probability of adopting NTMs.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 55 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.