SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements
16 references·0 citing·41 second hop
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for a Buyer with Complements (2017)A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechan…Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations (2015)Maximal revenue with multiple…Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices (2015)Combinatorial Auctions via Po…A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer (2014)A Simple and Approximately Op…Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient (2013)Simultaneous auctions are (al…On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items (2013)On revenue maximization for s…Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing (2010)Multi-parameter mechanism des…On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive (2009)On Maximizing Welfare When Ut…Core-selecting package auctions (2007)Core-selecting package auctio…Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations (2007)Algorithmic pricing via virtu…The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices (2005)The communication requirement…Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders (2005)Approximation algorithms for …Haggling over substitutes (2003)Haggling over substitutesTruth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions (2002)Truth revelation in approxima…Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening (1998)Ironing, Sweeping, and Multid…Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm (1983)Optimal Selling Strategies: W…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignTwo-Sided Matching (1990)Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets (2009)Computational Aspects of Cooperative Game Theory (2012)School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation (2013)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Incentives in Teams (1973)Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities (2005)Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2008)Approximate mechanism design without money (2009)Algorithmic Mechanism Design (2001)Combinatorial Auctions (2005)An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms (2012)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)The Simple Economics of Optimal Auctions (1989)Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization (2012)Recent Developments in the Economics of Price Discrimination (2013)The sample complexity of revenue maximization (2014)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Monopoly and product quality (1978)Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models (2000)Competitive Price Discrimination (2001)Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information (1983)Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders (1998)The Limits of Price Discrimination (2015)Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions (2002)An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders (2006)On maximizing welfare when utility functions are subadditive (2006)On the Hardness of Being Truthful (2008)Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values (1989)Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency (1999)Tractable stochastic analysis in high dimensions via robust optimization (2012)Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist (2017)Economic theory of teams (1972)Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)The Use of Knowledge in Society (1996)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 2002Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions658 cited
  • 1998Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening588 cited
  • 2010Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing422 cited
  • 1983Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm402 cited
  • 2007Core-selecting package auctions274 cited
  • 2007Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations266 cited
  • 2005The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices261 cited
  • 2003Haggling over substitutes175 cited
  • 2005Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders164 cited
  • 2014A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer150 cited
  • 2009On Maximizing Welfare When Utility Functions Are Subadditive144 cited
  • 2013On revenue maximization for selling multiple independently distributed items130 cited
  • 2015Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations127 cited
  • 2013Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient122 cited
  • 2015

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices
121 cited

Cited by

No citing works inside the corpus for this window.