Spinoza's Metaphysics of Desire: The demonstration of IIIP6

Abstract

In IIIP6, Spinoza claims that all things strive to persevere in their being. The importance of this claim for Spinoza’s philosophy cannot be overestimated. It is central to his metaphysics, psychology, ethics, and political philosophy. Yet, most recent commentators have viewed the demonstration of IIIP6 with skepticism. These commentators usually interpret the demonstration as an argument from the impossibility of self-destruction. I argue that, although the demonstration does indeed contain such an argument, there is a second and more persuasive argument in the demonstration that proceeds from the premise that singular things express divine power. I start with an interpretation of Spinoza’s notion of “expression” and show how it relates to his conception of efficient causality. In particular, I argue that the idea that effects express the natures of their efficient causes can be better understood if we take into account certain assumptions about efficient causality widely held in the seventeenth century. On the basis of this interpretation of expression, I show that Spinoza’s conatus doctrine is a natural consequence of his main premise: that finite things express divine power. Each natural thing, Spinoza tells us in IIIP6 of his Ethics, is animated by a striving (conatus) for self-preservation.1 This claim has significant ramifications for a wide variety of topics in Spinoza’s philosophy. For example, Spinoza appeals to his conatus doctrine in his explanation of basic metaphysical categories such as causality and essence, in his account of psychological phenomena such as will and desire, in his discussion of ethical topics such as virtue, and in his treatment of political concepts 1 “Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur.” All citations from Spinoza are from Gebhardt 1925. Most English translations are from Curley 1985 with occasional modifications. References to the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, Descartes’ “Principles of Philosophy”, Cogitata Metaphysica, and the Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being are abbreviated TdIE, DPP, CM, and KV respectively. Translations from the Tractatus TheologicoPoliticus (TTP hereafter) and the Tractatus Politicus (TP hereafter) are my own. In citations from the Ethics, I use the following abbreviations: roman numerals refer to parts; ‘P’ means ‘proposition’; ‘C’ means ‘corollary’; ‘S’ means ‘scholium’; ‘D’ means ‘demonstration’ e.g. ‘IVP37S’ means Ethics, part IV, proposition 37, scholium. Archiv f. Gesch. d. Philosophie 86. Bd., S. 21–55 © Walter de Gruyter 2004 ISSN 0003-9101 !rrrooouuuggghhhttt tttooo yyyooouuu bbbyyy ||| RRRuuutttgggeeerrrsss UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy LLLaaawww LLLiiibbbrrraaarrryyy AAAuuuttthhheeennntttiiicccaaattteeeddd ||| 111222888...666...222111888...777222 DDDooowwwnnnllloooaaaddd DDDaaattteee ||| 222///111999///111333 888:::333222 PPPMMM

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