A DILEMMA FOR THE KNOWLEDGE DESPITE FALSEHOOD STRATEGY

CHRISTOPHER T. BUFORD · Christopher Michael Cloos

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies

Abstract

ABSTRACT One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.

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1994Dispositional Beliefs and Dispositions to Believe 2012What is inference?1994The Inescapability of Gettier Problems 2005Knowledge from Falsehood 2012Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is inference”2013Against Boghossian, Wright and Broome on inference 2009Counter-Closure 2014Knowledge despite falsehood

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