Taking a chance on KK

Jeremy Goodman · Bernhard Salow

73 citations0/0 files storedPhilosophical Studies

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy and Theoretical Science Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge

Abstract

Dorr et al. (Philos Stud 170:277–287, 2014) present a case that poses a challenge for a number of plausible principles about knowledge and objective chance. Implicit in their discussion is an interesting new argument against KK, the principle that anyone who knows p is in a position to know that they know p. We bring out this argument, and investigate possible responses for defenders of KK, establishing new connections between KK and various knowledge-chance principles.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 73 citations exist upstream.

References

2000Knowledge and Its Limits 2002Knowledge and its Limits 1999Humean Supervenience debugged 1994Symposium: Chance and Credence 2010What Else Justification Could Be1 2016Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief 2014Could KK Be OK?

Cited by

2023Epistemology Normalized 2020The KK principle and rotational symmetry 2016How to be an Infallibilist*2019Internalism, Externalism, and the KK Principle 2019Justification, knowledge, and normality 2020New Work For Certainty 2018Higher order ignorance inside the margins 2021The rationality of epistemic akrasia

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.