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ABSTRACT Investigating how and why accounting professionals share useless and harmful knowledge challenges designers of accounting systems and organizational leaders. In this paper, we extend self-determination theory (SDT) to investigate the influence of financial incentives on (1) harmful, and (2) masked, i.e., organizationally useless, knowledge sharing (KS) among accounting professionals (n = 428) by adapting measures from SDT to the professional accounting context. Although self-disclosed dysfunctional KS is infrequent in our sample, the results indicate that, consistent with the predictions of our extension of SDT, accountants with higher controlled (higher autonomous) motivation are more (less) influenced by financial incentives and engage in more (less) dysfunctional KS. Data Availability: Contact the authors.
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