The Metaphysics of Dispositions and Causes

Abstract

Abstract In explaining what happens, we commonly use both dispositional and causal concepts. A historian might refer to the belligerent disposition of a nation-state, and use this to explain why a neighbouring state was so anxious to seek an apparently unwise alliance. A physicist might have occasion to mention the disposition of a metal to expand when heated, and use this to explain why a measurement was inaccurate when taken in abnormally hot conditions. The contexts of explanation— physics and history — are very different, but the concepts are recognizably causal and dispositional in both cases.

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