Wrestling with Constitutionalism: the Supermajority and the Hungarian Constitutional Court

Abstract

Abstract Since the elections of 2010, the right-wing coalition has a supermajority in the Hungarian Parliament, and is able to amend the Constitution without any further ado. The Constitution became a part of the political tool-kit which may and is amended as the government needs it to be amended. Under these circumstances, the Constitutional Court cannot be a vigorous guardian of constitutional values, and the Parliament did everything in order to housetrain the formerly widely acknowledged Constitutional Court: cut back its powers filled the bench with rather loyal justices and blocked the critical decisions. The present article is aimed to describe and to critically analyze these strategies in a national and European context.

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