Respecting Each Other and Taking Responsibility for Our Biases

Abstract

This chapter considers cases of morally problematic action where an agent acts in a biased way and the explanation is socialization and nonculpable false belief, rather than bad will on the part of the agent. In such cases, moral intuitions are pulled in two directions: on the one hand, nonculpable ignorance is usually an excuse, but in the case of acting in a biased way, there is reason to find the agent blameworthy. The chapter argues that although the paradigmatic account of blameworthiness is based on quality of will, we can and should be willing to allow that there are non-paradigmatic cases. The zone of responsibility can be extended to include acts that we are not fully in control of, and acts whose moral status we are nonculpably ignorant about at the time of acting. This extension of responsibility happens through a voluntary taking of responsibility.

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