Attention, Psychology, and Pluralism

Abstract

There is an overriding orthodoxy amongst philosophers that attention is a ‘unified phenomenon’, subject to explanation by one monistic theory. In this article, I examine whether this philosophical orthodoxy is reflected in the practice of psychology. I argue that the view of attention that best represents psychological work is a variety of conceptual pluralism. When it comes to the psychology of attention, monism should be rejected and pluralism should be embraced. 1 The Monistic Consensus2 The Varieties of Pluralism3 Three Concepts 3.1 Blindsight 3.2 Executive attention 3.3 Alerting4 Pluralism 4.1 Methodological conceptual pluralism 4.2 Three monist interpretations5 Philosophical Monism?6 Conclusion

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