Introduction: Perception Without Representation

Abstract

This special issue focuses upon the debate between representational views and these emerging relational views of perception. We aim to elucidate relational views of perception in a way that facilitates a more nuanced debate (see Brewer, Travis, Martin). Other contributions explore the phenomenal character of experience and its explanatory role (Brogaard, Dokic and Martin, Eilan), and reappraise existing arguments both for (Brogaard) and against (O’Sullivan, Judge, Ivanov) relational views. We hope that this goes some way towards demonstrating that, far from being an implausible fringe view, relational theories constitute a significant and genuine attempt to overcome some central problems in the philosophy of perception, and, as such, are worthy of further consideration—not least by their opponents. Erratum to: Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245‑017‑9460‑1. In the original publication of the article, the M. G. F. Martin quotation under the section “Relational Views” cited as (2004: 93) is from p. 83 of his (1997) The reality of appearances, in Sainsbury M. (ed) Thought and ontology, Franco Angeli, Milano, pp. 81–106, reprinted on p. 93 of Byrne A., Logue H. (eds) (2009) Disjunctivism: contemporary readings, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 91–115. DOI 10.1007/s11245-017-9489-1.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 48 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.